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I.  INTRODUCTION 
After the death of Pope John Paul II, a papal conclave convened 
to elect his successor. The media speculated that certain candidates 
were the “frontrunners” to watch.1 At the same time, pools formed on 
web sites to predict the outcome of the conclave, either for fun (using 
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 1. John Tierney, The Smart Money, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2005, at A21 (discussing 
favorites in the media and claiming that the online speculating would soon overtake 
media pundits in predicting future events). 
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virtual money) or for profit.2 Throughout the days that the conclave 
met in April of 2005, trading continued, and ultimately the various 
markets predicted both that Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger would 
emerge as the next pope3 and that he would choose the name 
Benedict XVI.4 After the white smoke signifying a new pope had 
cleared, the online traders had accurately predicted the outcome of 
the conclave when the new Pope, the former Cardinal Ratzinger, 
emerged to give his first official speech from the Vatican balcony.5
Similar pools appeared around the trial of celebrity Michael 
Jackson in 2005 on various child molestation charges.6 During the 
course of the trial, several online markets emerged to trade on the 
outcome. The public had always expressed an intense interest in 
Jackson’s personal life, and the latest controversy provoked further 
speculation. Although trading shifted during the presentation of 
evidence by the prosecution, ultimately the market strongly 
predicted Jackson’s acquittal.7 When the verdict was read by the 
jury, Jackson had been acquitted of all charges.8
 2. Stephanie McCrummen, Pope Pick Fair Game for Gamblers: Internet Bettors 
Wager on New Pontiff, Name He’ll Use, WASH. POST, April 5, 2005, at B1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26353-2005Apr4.html. 
 3. Matt Crenson, Bettors Gambling on Germany’s Cardinal Ratzinger, GUELPH 
MERCURY, April 16, 2005, at A7 (“[A]mong those speculating about who the next pope 
will be, the big money – literally – is on Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, who delivered a 
stirring homily at the late Pope’s funeral. . . . As of yesterday, most gambling sites 
gave Ratzinger . . . the best odds, with a host of second-tier candidates not far 
behind.”); Gamblers Betting on German, TORONTO SUN, April 18, 2005, at 6; see also 
Papal Election, http://www.popebetting.com (web site on pope bets that is part of 
Paddy Power, www.paddypower.com, the Irish gaming web site) (beginning with odds 
of 12/1 on Cardinal Ratzinger, then reducing his odds to make him the favorite at 3/1, 
with competition from Francis Arinze of Nigeria and two Italian candidates); Jeffrey 
Fleishman, Who the Next Pope Will Be is Up For Speculation, L.A. TIMES, April 13, 
2005, at A3 (quoting British gambling service William Hill as stating that Cardinal 
Arinze was the favorite, with Archbishop Tettamanzi, Cardinal Ratzinger and 
Cardinal Hummes as others to watch); Bookies Like Ratzinger, TORONTO SUN, April 
16, 2005, at 12 (quoting British gambling service William Hill as stating that they 
were slashing the odds on Cardinal Ratzinger, making him the favorite). 
 4. Frank Delaney, Holy Rollers and Papal Perfectas, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2005, 
at A19 (listing Benedict as the favorite); Tom Heneghan, New Pope’s First Message? ‘A 
Name is a Sign’, boston.com, April 15, 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/world/ 
europe/articles/2005/04/14/new_popes_first_message_a_name_is_a_sign. 
 5. Stephen Evans, Futures Market Right on New Pope, BBC NEWS, April 19, 
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4457715.stm. 
 6. Kelefa Sanneh, The Whispering Pop Star Who’s So Hard to Love, and So Hard 
to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2005 at E1. 
 7. Smart Money on Acquittal in Jackson Case: Online Betting Sites Offering Odds 
on Outcoming [sic] of Trial, MSNBC, May 24, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7965657. 
 8. Jonathan D. Glater, Weighing Celebrity Justice: Blind or Biased?, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 15, 2005 at A14; Michael J. Lewis, Pleasure Domes for Millionaires, and Other 
Lost Boys, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, § 9, at 10. 
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With both the papal conclave and Michael Jackson verdict, the 
various pools attracted a large number of participants and ultimately 
predicted the outcomes accurately. In both instances, these pools 
acted as information markets, also known as “prediction markets” 
and “idea futures.” 9 As we have written elsewhere,10 information 
markets are an emerging economic field in which individuals are 
provided incentives to trade on their knowledge and in the process 
produce predictions.11 The economic literature has defined an 
information market as a setting where “participants trade in 
contracts whose payoff depends on unknown future events.”12 The 
point of a particular information market, however, is not to provide 
financial or reputational gain to the participants or to raise capital.13 
 9. Information markets are also known in the economic literature as “prediction 
markets,” “artificial markets,” or “idea futures.” ROBIN HANSON, IMPOLITE 
INNOVATION: THE TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS OF ‘TERRORISM FUTURES’ AND OTHER 
DECISION MARKETS 4 (July 2005) (on file with authors and at 
http://hanson.gmu.edu/impolite.pdf) [hereinafter HANSON, IMPOLITE INNOVATION]. 
 10. Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices: Using 
Information Markets to Predict Supreme Court Decisions, 100 NW. U. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 4, on file with authors). 
 11. HANSON, IMPOLITE INNOVATION, supra note 9, at 4 (“Orange Juice futures 
improve on National Weather Service forecasts, horse race markets beat horse race 
experts, Academy Award markets beat columnist forecasts, gas demand markets beat 
gas demand experts, stock markets beat the official NASA panel at fingering the guilty 
company in the Challenger accident, election markets beat national opinion polls, and 
corporate sales markets beat official corporate forecasts.”). 
 12. Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitezewitz, Prediction Markets 2 (AEI-Brookings Joint 
Ctr. for Regulatory Studies 2004), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/ 
admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1027. This article was also published in The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2004. Note that the term “information market” 
has had a wide variety of meanings among various legal commentators. Until recently, 
this term was used in legal settings to denote a number of different concepts. The term 
was used to describe new types of financial opportunities that the advent of the 
internet created. See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, Trading Posts in Cyberspace: Information 
Markets and the Construction of Proprietary Rights, 44 B.C. L. REV. 545, 547 (2003). 
The term has also been used to describe the practices of companies that collect 
information about individuals surfing the internet and then resell that information. 
See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2055, 2082 (2004) (using “information market” in the context of personal data). 
Interesting as these concepts and areas are, they are not the same type of “information 
market” described and analyzed herein. 
 13. To say that there is an overarching “point” to a market beyond gains or losses 
of individual traders is not a novel concept. After all, the justification for stock markets 
is that they readily raise capital for business and thereby fund all sorts of 
technological innovation. See, e.g, Claudio Michelacci & Javier Suarez, Business 
Creation and the Stock Market, 71 REV. ECON. STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (discussing how 
the stock market encourages “business creation, [innovation,] and growth” by allowing 
“the recycling of informed capital”). 
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Rather, the organizers structure the market to gather information 
that will aid in determining the outcome of a future event.14
This Article focuses on why information markets have covered 
certain subject areas, sometimes of minor importance, while 
neglecting other subject areas of greater significance. To put it 
another way, why do information markets exist to predict the 
outcome of the papal conclave and the Michael Jackson trial, but no 
information markets exist to predict government policy conclusions, 
Supreme Court decisions, or the rulings in Delaware corporate law 
cases? Arguably, from either a dollar value or a social utility 
perspective, these areas of law and business would be more 
important than the outcome of, say, the Jackson trial. Why, then, do 
these “frivolous” markets on celebrities like Michael Jackson thrive, 
while others with more serious aims have yet to be started? 
In attempting to answer this question, we first wish to give the 
reader a more detailed explanation of information markets and how 
they work. Section II therefore recounts the predictive successes of 
information markets in everything from presidential elections to the 
television game show “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?.” Then we 
present data from interviews with market founders about their 
motivations in starting various information markets. In Section III, 
we insert the empirical data into an analytical framework, exploring 
where markets exist, where they do not, and some of the reasons, 
including legal considerations and business models, that affect the 
subjects that information markets cover. In particular, the laws 
about gambling seem to have had a significant impact on the 
development of information markets. 
In Section IV, we suggest that, despite a trend toward 
information markets in entertainment and politics, the emergence of 
an information market in any particular subject area is at least 
partially the product of a random walk, meaning that it cannot be 
predicted in advance from past data.15 Finally, in the last part of our 
Article, we contemplate whether information markets must endure 
the vagaries of the random walk or whether they could develop in a 
 14. It is the deliberate structure, the intention to capture information, that 
differentiates information markets from typical capital markets. Capital markets also 
generate a level of prediction through the process of price discovery, but this is a 
secondary effect, not the primary goal of such markets. See generally Michael T. Chng, 
A Model of Price Discovery and Market Design: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 24 J. 
FUTURE MARKETS 1107, 1108-09 (2004) (describing price discovery function performed 
by derivatives markets). 
 15. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 24 (8th ed. 
2003) (defining random walk as “one “in which future steps or directions cannot be 
predicted on the basis of past actions.”). Greater detail about the meaning of a random 
walk in the context of the emergence of information markets is provided below. 
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more organized and systematic way, either through private 
institutions or through government action. The answers have 
implications for the possibility of government sponsorship, the 
development of these markets, and, perhaps more broadly, the 
growth of any new field that individual entrepreneurs develop. 
We think this topic worth exploring — despite the early stage of 
this field — because of the importance of information markets and 
how they develop. Yet we quickly confess that the newness of this 
area makes any analysis difficult and subject to later revision. The 
data we have are preliminary, and further developments may 
undermine or refute any current explanation offered. We nonetheless 
hope that our current explorations will provide material for 
consideration. Although that goal is modest, we think it worth 
attempting in light of the great potential of information markets. 
II. ORIGINS OF INFORMATION MARKETS 
A. How Information Markets Work 
In this first section, we provide a brief description of how 
information markets work. Information markets organize and 
aggregate individual knowledge into a collective judgment. Although 
information markets are a new idea, their central insight — that the 
collective judgment of the many can be wiser than the conclusion of 
one person — are embedded in many of our legal institutions. From 
the jury system to multi-member courts, the legal system frequently 
entrusts determinations of guilt, innocence, and liability to 
collectives.16 Information markets take the idea of group 
decisionmaking far further, greatly expanding the number of 
participants.17 Instead of a twelve-member jury or a three-judge 
 16. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The jury’s role is, at least in part, premised 
on the idea that a group will be able to assess facts more accurately than an individual 
fact-finder. The premise has mathematical support; the Condorcet Jury Theorem 
suggests that when choosing between two alternatives, one of which is correct, juries 
will reach the correct result more often than a single fact-finder. See Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1498 
(1999) (listing Condorcet Jury Theorem as one factor that improves a jury’s ability to 
assess facts with accuracy); Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol 
Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 76-77 (2003) (discussing 
voting patterns on multimember courts as well as game theory and the doctrinal 
paradoxes that can accompany voting on such courts); Michael Abramowicz, En Banc 
Revisited, 100 COLUM. L . REV. 1600, 1602, 1632 (2000) [hereinafter Abramowicz, En 
Banc] (proposing, innovatively, use of visiting panels from across circuits to sit en 
banc, and basing this proposal in part on Condorcet Jury Theorem). 
 17. Juries and multi-member courts engage in a deliberative function, which is 
valued as helping to achieve more accurate outcomes as well as for process reasons. 
Information markets, however, are not deliberative, and information markets employ 
incentives for correct predictions. Although there are these significant differences, we 
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panel evaluating and weighing a factual assessment about a past 
event, in an information market, thousands of people can join 
together to predict events, such as the outcome of a presidential 
election.18
Each trader in the information market acts to maximize his or 
her own reward. At the same time, the organizers of the market 
aggregate the results and harvest the valuable information that 
individuals have generated. The theory behind information markets 
is loosely related to the semi-strong version of the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH), which holds that, in a properly functioning capital 
market, the prices of securities will reflect all relevant publicly 
available information.19 The price of a security on the market encodes 
a significant amount of information, including beliefs about the 
efficacy of management, the potential for future products, and 
possible market expansions.20 In other words, most markets have a 
“price discovery” function, aggregating information and predictions 
into the current price of that security.21 In traditional capital 
markets, however, the information-seeking aspects are, to a certain 
degree, by-products of trading and raising capital. In contrast, this 
information-seeking is the sole reason for the information market’s 
existence. 
In his recent popular book, The Wisdom of Crowds, James 
Surowiecki explains numerous ways in which such collective 
knowledge can be employed.22 Surowiecki describes an experiment in 
which individuals tried to guess the correct number of jelly beans in 
a jar, for which they would win a prize.23 The experimenter took the 
individual guesses and averaged them, resulting in a number only a 
few away from the actual number of jelly beans.24 The average of all 
mention juries and multimember courts to emphasize that group decisionmaking is 
commonly accepted in our legal system. 
 18. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (discussing how Iowa Electronic 
Markets have been predicting the outcomes of elections since 1988). 
 19. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 552-53 (1984). 
 20. See Fama, supra note 19. 
 21. See generally Cass Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, 
Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1023 (2005) (explaining 
how information markets can improve group decisionmaking processes and 
mentioning price discovery function). 
 22. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xiv, 3-4 (2004). 
 23. Id. at 5; Jack L. Treynor, Market Efficiency and the Bean Jar Experiment, FIN. 
ANALYSTS J., May-Jun. 1987, at 50. 
 24. Id. 
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the guesses was extremely accurate.25 Whether individuals are asked 
to estimate the location of a sunken submarine,26 to guess the weight 
of an ox,27 or to help a contestant on the game show “Who Wants to 
Be a Millionaire,”28 groups provide accurate answers to questions 
that most individuals would not be able to answer on their own. 
At present, there are twenty-one information markets open to 
the general public, 29 and approximately one to two dozen internal, 
company, or private information markets that operate to make 
predictions.30 For example, during the past two hotly contested 
presidential elections, participants voted in the Iowa Electronic 
Markets (“IEM”).31 The IEM, started in 1988 by academics at the 
University of Iowa Business School, has been operating since that 
time to predict the outcomes of various elections.32 An individual 
trader is limited to a $500 investment, so although the financial 
stake of any one person in the outcome is modest, each still has a 
financial incentive for making a correct prediction.33
 25. In Treynor’s experiment, the jar had 850 jelly beans. The average of the group’s 
guesses was 871, and of the fifty-six who made guesses, only one was more accurate 
than the group average. Id. 
 26. SUROWIECKI, supra note 22, at xx-xxi. 
 27. Id. at xi-xiii. 
 28. On the television program “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire” contestants had to 
answer trivia questions in multiple-choice format. Each contestant had several 
“lifelines” that they could use, including narrowing the options, telephoning a friend, 
and polling the audience. Although the first two options were often helpful, the 
audience for the television program was the most helpful of all, achieving a 91 percent 
success rate. Cf. Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 
734 n.22 (2001) (providing “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire” poll of the audience as 
illustration of the Condorcet Jury Theorem). 
 29. See infra App. A. 
 30. The estimate about the number of private markets is from an interview with 
Robin Hanson, who estimates there are between one and two dozen internal private 
markets. Telephone Interview with Robin Hanson, Associate Professor of Economics, 
George Mason University (Aug. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Hanson Interview]. 
 31. See, e.g., Jordan Erin, Iowa Electronic Markets Yield Near-Accurate Result, 
DES MOINES REG., Nov. 10, 2004, at 5b, available at 2004 WLNR 15070349. The IEM 
trades at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem. 
 32. JOYCE BERG ET AL., C. BUS. ADMIN. U. IOWA, RESULTS FROM A DOZEN YEARS OF 
ELECTION FUTURES MARKETS RESEARCH, 1 (Nov. 2000), available at 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/BFNR_2000.pdf [hereinafter BERG, ET AL., 
RESULTS]. The IEM has also expanded into predictions further afield from its base of 
political predictions. See, e.g., id. at 7 n.10; Jordan Erin, U of I Markets Tapped to 
Predict Flu Activity, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 22, 2004, at 1B. 
 33. See Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: 
Lessons from the Iowa Electronic Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. 
CORP. L. 589, 593 (2003) [hereinafter Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets]. 
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The IEM has predicted the outcomes of elections more accurately 
than polls have, beating the polls seventy-six percent of the time.34 
This accuracy occurs despite the fact that researchers at the 
University of Iowa have concluded that many of the market 
participants exhibit a strong bias toward particular candidates.35 
Apparently, the market is able to correct for these biases through 
arbitrage.36 Sensing an opportunity for profit, arbitrageurs temper 
the ideological biases that some of the participants bring with them 
when they make their initial investment in the IEM.37
Another successfully functioning information market is the 
Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX), which has “approximately 400,000 
registered accounts.”38 The HSX is a “fantasy stock market,” allowing 
trades in “virtual” money, and is successful in predicting which 
movies will be blockbusters and which will be box office bombs.39 
Although traders set the market price for shares of a movie’s stock, 
the price is tied to the movie’s financial performance.40 Once the film 
 34. Joyce Berg et al., Accuracy and Forecast Standard Error of Prediction Markets 
12-13, 33 (July 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file with U. of Iowa, Dep’t of Acct., 
Econ., & Fin.), available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/forecasting.pdf 
[hereinafter Berg et al., Accuracy]. 
 35. See BERG ET AL., RESULTS, supra note 32, at 5. The average trader is younger, 
more likely to be a white male, Republican, and of a higher socio-economic status than 
the average voter. Berg et al., Accuracy, supra note 34, at 10. 
 36. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock 
Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 140 
n.15 (2002) (defining arbitrage as “the process by which informed traders buy or sell in 
such a way as to eliminate any mispricing caused by uninformed trading. For example, 
when a stock becomes overvalued because uninformed traders are bidding it up, 
informed traders would sell, hence moving the price back to its rational expectations 
equilibrium.”). 
 37. See BERG ET AL., RESULTS, supra note 32, at 6. 
 38. See DAVID M. PENNOCK ET AL, THE POWER OF PLAY: EFFICIENCY AND FORECAST 
ACCURACY IN WEB MARKET GAMES 5 (NEC RESEARCH INST. 2001), available at 
http://artificialmarkets.com/am/pennock-neci-tr-2000-168.pdf. The Hollywood Stock 
Exchange has its web site and trading market at http://www.hsx.com. 
 39. See Norm Alster, It’s Just a Game, but Hollywood is Paying Attention, N. Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, §3 at 4, available at 2003 WLNR 5231448; Jack M. Balkin, 
Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 2043, 2070 (2004) (discussing the creation of “virtual” property in online games). 
See also Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets, supra note 33, at 593 (“HSX offers good 
predictions of a film’s gross receipts before release and, relatively speaking, even 
better predictions after opening weekend — when a large number of traders have some 
information in the form of (or at least the possibility of) observing the finished film on 
screen, along with audience reactions. Apparently, studios have begun relying on these 
estimates to structure the distribution of their films.”); Russ Ray, Prediction Markets: 
Betting on Risk Management, RISK MGMT., Apr. 1, 2004, at 58, available at 2004 
WLNR 11238320. 
 40. PENNOCK ET AL., supra note 38, at 6. See Hollywood Stock Exchange 
Homepage, http://www.hsx.com. 
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has been in release for a month, the stock “delists” and the 
shareholders are cashed out.41 Shareholders receive an amount of 
virtual money pegged to the amount of real money that the movie 
made during that period.42 Traders may also sell their stocks short if 
they believe that a movie’s stock values are overpriced.43 In addition, 
the HSX allows traders to guess the outcomes of the Academy 
Awards, and these aggregated predictions have proved to be 
startlingly accurate.44
Other successful information markets are smaller and private, 
limiting participation to the members of a particular organization. 
For example, Hewlett Packard (HP) used an internal information 
market to predict monthly sales volumes.45 The information market 
in this case was thin, that is, it encompassed a relatively small 
number — twenty to thirty — of participants.46 The market had 
participants from various corporate departments, who remained 
anonymous.47 Despite the small numbers of participants, the 
information market produced more accurate forecasts than those 
that the company had put forward officially.48 In addition to the IEM, 
 41. PENNOCK ET AL., supra note 38, at 6. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. In traditional financial markets, a short sale is defined as: 
the sale of borrowed shares by an investor who expects the stock’s price to 
decline. If it does, the investor profits on the difference between the amount 
realized when the shares were sold and the lower price paid to ‘cover’ the 
short position. If, however, the stock goes up, the investor’s loss is limited 
only by how quickly the short sale is covered. 
Priscilla Ann Smith, OTC Focus - Short-Sale Data Can Signal More Than Pessimism, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1986. For further discussion of short-selling as well as financial 
derivatives, and their importance for the study of corporate law, see Frank Partnoy, 
Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA. L. REV. 599, 604-605 (2000). 
 44. See Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets, supra note 33, at 594. In a widely 
publicized story in 2000, The Wall Street Journal queried members of the academy in 
order to formulate predictions and publish a story touting the winners in advance of 
the awards show. Despite obtaining this inside information, the newspaper 
underperformed against the HSX, which predicted more accurately which nominees 
would win academy awards. See id.; Lisa Gubernick, And the Winner Is, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 24, 2000, at W1; see also Justin Lahart, Trading the Oscars, CNN/MONEY, Mar. 
11, 2003, http://www.hsx.com/about/press/030311_1.htm. 
 45. KAY-YUT CHEN & CHARLES R. PLOTT, DIVISION OF THE HUMAN & SOC. SCI., 
CAL. INST. OF TECH., INFORMATION AGGREGATION MECHANISMS: CONCEPT, DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION FOR A SALES FORECASTING PROBLEM 6, (2002), available at 
http://www.hpl.hp.com/personal/Kay-Yut_Chen/paper/ms020408.pdf. 
 46. Id. at 5, 10. 
 47. See id. at 10. 
 48. Id. at 12-15. Part of this difference might be explained by a failure of 
individuals to share information across departments, but this also might be the result 
of incentives that skew official sales predictions. For example, there might be extreme 
pressure from top management to reach a particular sales goal; at the same time, 
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HSX, and the internal HP market, there are currently numerous 
other information markets that are successfully functioning.49
B. Interviews with Market Founders 
Having set forth an overview of current information markets, we 
turn to what some of the founders have said about the origins of their 
markets. Here, our research objectives were more journalistic than 
empirical. In other words, while we tried to interview as many 
founders who we could reach and who were willing,50 we do not 
pretend that we conducted a empirical survey. Rather, our hope was 
to add color and factual detail to what might otherwise be purely an 
intellectual analysis. We found the results interesting and suggestive 
of broader themes explored below regarding randomness in the origin 
of information markets. 
One of the leaders in the field of information markets is Robin D. 
Hanson, an economics professor at George Mason University. He has 
been involved in founding two information markets and worked to 
found another one (which fell victim to political controversy). Hanson 
was first involved in creating an information market in 1989-1990 
with internal information at Xanadu Inc., a computer company 
attempting to forecast whether they would deliver their product.51 
Why did they pick this subject for one of the early information 
markets? Essentially, it was a subject that the company’s employees 
were “very interested in.”52 The employees at Xanadu recognized that 
they had a tendency to fool themselves about when they might be 
able to complete a product, and the information market was a way to 
impose discipline on their predictions.53
The second information market in which Hanson was involved 
was the Foresight Exchange, which began in September 1994.54 Most 
of the early predictions involved science-related topics such as cold 
individual salespeople might have incentives to underestimate goals so that they can 
later “look good” when they exceed the sales quota. Cf. Gary F. Goldring, Mandatory 
Disclosure of Corporate Projections and the Goals of Securities Regulation, 81 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1525, 1535 (1981) (discussing underestimation in corporate projections); 
William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting and the Paradox of Compliance, 
52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1413, 1413 n.295 (1999) (discussing pressure on employees to 
meet sales goals). 
 49. See infra App. A. 
 50. Not all of the market founders were able to be reached, and not everyone we 
reached participated in the interviews. Nevertheless, we were struck by the eagerness 
of some who did respond, and we think their sharing of their experiences contributes 
to a better understanding of the emergence of these new economic instruments. 
 51. Hanson Interview, supra note 30, at 2. 
 52. Id. at 3. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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fusion or global warming.55 This was a response to Hanson’s 
suggestion to attract participants to bet on science-related topics.56 
Why did this suggestion arise? Hanson had a long-standing interest 
in the philosophy of science, stretching from his academic work as an 
undergraduate and master’s student.57
Finally, Hanson may be best known for his work with the Policy 
Analysis Market (“PAM”), a proposed information marked about 
political instability in the Middle East sponsored by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”), an agency of the 
Department of Defense.58 Why was this subject area chosen? 
Initially, Hanson was looking for the subject of the “most dollar value 
to the Department of Defense” and thought political instability in the 
Middle East was the most likely subject.59
PAM did not have a happy future. Two U.S. senators criticized 
the project, the Defense Department withdrew its sponsorship, and 
its supervisor resigned.60 Hanson observes that this outcome was 
shaped by factors that had nothing to do with the merits of PAM. In 
the political context, DARPA administrator John Poindexter (who to 
Hanson’s knowledge had no direct involvement with PAM) was 
politically controversial, and his political opponents, according to 
Hanson, were “looking for something to get him.”61 Hanson also notes 
that Democrats are prone to attack Republicans for being too friendly 
toward markets, and he notes, “If [Albert] Gore was elected, we’d still 
be going.”62
Other founders of information markets were influenced more by 
the business potential than science or politics. Emile Servan-
Schrieber, the chief executive officer of NewsFutures, Inc., runs three 
public information markets: a current events market called 
NewsFutures, a market in technology and business called Innovation 
Futures, and a Tech Buzz Game about information technology.63
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Hanson Interview, supra note 30, at 3. 
 58. Id. at 4-5. This project has sometimes been characterized as involving 
“terrorism futures.” Hanson rejects this characterization as inaccurate and notes that 
global deaths from terrorism were merely one of many global parameters to be 
explored in the market. Id. 
 59. Id. at 6. 
 60. See ROBIN D. HANSON, THE INFORMED PRESS FAVORED THE POLICY ANALYSIS 
MARKET 2 (2005), http://hanson.gmu.edu/vita.html. 
 61. Hanson Interview, supra note 30, at 8. 
 62. Id. 
 63. E-mail from Emile Servan-Schreiber, CEO NewsFutures, to Robert L. Rogers 
(Aug. 3, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Servan-Schreiber Interview]. In 
addition to these public markets, NewsFutures also offers private information markets 
to corporate clients. 
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Servan-Schreiber created his company in part as a result of his 
long-running interest in journalism.64 His family has run several 
press ventures in France, and Servan-Schreiber thought that 
prediction markets “could be the basis for a new type of journalism: 
let the readers collectively predict what will happen tomorrow based 
on what they read today. And treat those predictions as content 
themselves, yielding a truly new form of interaction between a media 
outlet and its audience.”65 Servan-Schreiber’s co-investor, Maurice 
Balick was motivated by his belief “in the ability of free markets to 
allocate resources efficiently and predict outcomes through 
information aggregation.”66 Yet despite these academic interests, in 
operating the market Servan-Schreiber is “definitely business 
focused.”67 He hopes to make a profit, “if only because it’s hard to 
argue that you’re contributing something useful if no one is willing to 
pay for it.”68
John Delaney is the chief executive officer of the Trade Exchange 
Network Limited, which owns information markets such as 
www.tradesports.com and www.intrade.com.69 When he started in 
March 2000, the most commonly traded subjects were sports and 
financial matters, which Delaney thought were topics that would be 
“most immediately acclimated” by the target group of individuals in 
the 20-45 age group with high amounts of disposable income.70 Since 
then, the available topics for trading have expanded to cover a wide 
range of subjects, including current events, political elections, 
weather, and entertainment.71
Delaney sees enormous potential for information markets and 
thinks they may have a role to play in “every issue that is material to 
people.”72 He notes, however, that while Trade Exchange Network is 
an Ireland-based company, the service can be accessed from at least 
192 jurisdictions. These multitude of laws pose challenges, 
particularly when existing laws change, may be unclear, and do not 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. E-mail from Emile Servan-Schreiber, CEO NewsFutures, to Robert L. Rogers, 
containing statement of Maurice Balick, CEO NewsFutures (Aug. 6, 2005) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Balick Interview]. 
 67. Servan-Schreiber Interview, supra note 63. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Telephone Interview with John Delaney, Chief Executive Officer, Trade 
Exchange Network, Ltd. (Jan. 24, 2006). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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always “elegantly embrace” the type of products and services offered 
by information markets.73
In sum, the founders’ stories do not seem to present any unified 
explanation for why information markets have developed where they 
have. With the Trade Exchange Network, John Delaney targeted 
initial topics to reach a desired demographic group, but in other 
cases, the founders’ stories suggest that their information markets 
are, at least to some degree, results of their personal experiences. 
Hanson studied philosophy of science, and one of his initial markets 
focused on scientific questions. Servan-Schreiber came from a press 
family and saw the potential of information markets to shape media. 
This diversity of motivations is not particularly astonishing, but it 
does have implications for the predictability of the emergence of 
information markets, a subject that we address in greater detail in 
Section IV below. 
III. TRACING TRENDS IN MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
In this section of the Article, we analyze the subjects covered by 
existing information markets and conclude that, for the most part, 
markets have most commonly arisen in two broadly defined areas: 
political elections and entertainment. 
In the first part of this section, we analyze why this might be so, 
specifically examining the business models used by many 
information market founders and what impact those business models 
have on the subject matter of the market. Besides looking at the 
supply side, we also examine the attractions of information markets 
to participants and ask why individuals might be more willing to 
participate in certain markets than in others. In doing so, we use 
insights from cognitive psychology, including the “flow” experiences 
identified by psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. 
In the second part of this section, we examine the 
underdeveloped markets — areas where information markets could 
potentially lead to predictions that would significantly advance 
human knowledge or generate wealth — where markets have yet to 
be developed. And, in the final part of this section, we discuss the 
role that structural factors, such as legal constraints, have had in the 
development of information markets in particular areas. 
A. The Lure of Information Markets 
To date, most information markets tend to cluster around two 
broad subject areas, politics and entertainment. More than fifty 
percent of the current public information markets deal with these 
 73. Id. 
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two subject areas alone.74 This seems to be a startling subject 
concentration, especially given the proven predictive capabilities of 
information markets and the number of questions that they could 
help to answer. 
There are currently twenty-one functioning public information 
markets. Of these twenty-one public information markets, six have 
elections or politics as their central focus. Indeed, one of the most 
groundbreaking paradigmatic information markets, the IEM, 
described in Section II, supra, has as its focus the outcome of the U.S. 
presidential elections. Dealing with foreign politics, the Austrian 
Political Stock Markets focus on Austrian elections,75 Wahlstreet 
focuses on the outcome of German politics,76 and the Election Stock 
Market focuses on Canadian elections.77 Another market, the 
Political Stock Exchange, 78 allows participants to purchase shares of 
politicians and shares of political events, with participation by the 
general public using virtual money.79 Finally, the Washington Stock 
Exchange focuses on predicting U.S. congressional races and pending 
federal legislation.80
The other popular area for information markets is 
entertainment. While “entertainment” broadly defined could include 
everything from opera to chess, we use it here to mean the Hollywood 
entertainment industry, including movies and television productions, 
and competitive sporting events with spectators, such as basketball 
and football. Of the twenty-one public information markets, three 
have entertainment or sports as their central focus. The Hollywood 
Stock Exchange, described in Section II, tries to predict whether a 
particular movie will be a success at the box office. Another example 
is the Celebdaq market,81 which allows participants to buy shares of 
a celebrity, with incentives based on the celebrity’s popularity, and 
dividends based on the amount of press coverage that the celebrity 
receives. Finally, TradeSports82 allows the general public to invest 
 74. See infra App. A. Attached as an appendix to this article is a listing of current 
public information markets, along with the general subjects that each market 
addresses. 
 75. Austrian Political Stock Markets/Austrian Electronic Markets, 
http://www.imw.tuwien.ac.at/apsm, (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 76. Wahlstreet, http://www.wahlstreet.de (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 77. UBC, Election Stock Market, http://esm.ubc.ca (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 78. The Political Stock Exchange, http://www.politistock.com (last visited Jan. 1, 
2006). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Washington Stock Exchange, http://www.washingtonsx.com (last visited Feb. 
22, 2006). 
 81. Celebdaq, http://www.bbc.co.uk/celebdaq (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 82. Tradesports , http://www.tradesports.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
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real money in futures contracts, primarily for sporting events, but 
also for politics, current events, and other topics. 
Of the twenty-one public information markets, four additional 
markets also contain significant coverage of politics and 
entertainment. The News Futures83 market allows virtual money 
participants the opportunity to predict news, financial, sports, and 
entertainment news. Although the focus of the market is best 
classified as “current events,” meaning newsworthy current stories, a 
significant portion of the predictions deal with the entertainment 
industry, sporting events, or politics. Another information market, 
InTrade,84 allows participants to make a variety of predictions, 
including predictions about politics and entertainment. The Public 
Knowledge Exchange includes trading on futures in world events.85 
Finally, the Foresight Exchange86 allows participants to predict a 
number of questions, some of which involve the outcomes of future 
political elections. Although the focus of the four markets is current 
events, that includes heavy doses of both politics and entertainment. 
Indeed, the forgoing analysis shows that out of the twenty one 
public information markets currently operating, six have political 
elections as their focus, three have entertainment and sports as their 
focus, and four have a broader focus but one that incorporates 
politics, sports, and entertainment as a major concentration of the 
market. Therefore, thirteen of twenty-one public markets are 
concentrating in the areas of politics and entertainment. And so the 
next questions to ask are why are these subject areas so highly 
developed, when others, that are of possibly far greater social utility, 
have been relatively neglected? What are the attractions of these 
markets to founders? What attracts participants to trade in these 
markets? The next two sections provide some answers. 
1. Attractions to Founders 
Although the intellectual challenges of the field may be an 
attraction, the founders, particularly of the for-profit exchanges 
involving real money, also have financial motivations.87 Although 
this is not true of non-profit educational ventures such as the IEM, 
which is run by the Iowa University School of Business, most are run 
by private for-profit firms. We have discussed above what some of the 
 83. NewsFutures, http://www.us.newsfutures.com/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 
2006). 
 84. InTrade, http://www.intrade.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 85. Public Knowledge Exchange, http://www.publicgyan.com (last visited Feb. 22, 
2006). 
 86. Foresight Exchange, http://www.ideosphere.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 87. See, e.g., Servan-Schreiber Interview, supra note 63. 
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founders said about their motivations for starting particular 
markets. Here, we look more broadly at larger trends that seem 
applicable to their choices, including the selection of a business 
model. 
To some extent, the subject area of the market seems to be 
driven by the choice of the business model that information market 
entrepreneurs select. Firms running information markets seem to be 
choosing business models similar to those employed by traditional 
brokerage firms or the Internet businesses of the new economy. In 
part, it is these decisions about the business model that drive the 
decision about what subject matter the information markets will 
cover, as we discuss below. 
Under the business model that a traditional brokerage firm uses, 
investors are initially charged a fee for setting up an account. The 
brokerage firm also charges investors for managing their portfolio.88 
If the investors prefer a more active role, the brokerage firm will 
charge fees for executing their trades.89 Brokerage houses sustain 
themselves by charging investors what is essentially a “transaction 
cost” on their trades. 
In the context of information markets, several of the currently 
existing markets generate profits through such a traditional 
brokerage business model. For example, Tradesports charges 
customers to establish an account, and then charges a monetary fee 
for each trade that a customer executes on the information market.90 
Increased attention to any particular predictive market will result in 
more accounts being opened. More accounts lead to correspondingly 
higher revenues for the information market maker. Similarly, an 
increase in trading results in higher commissions for the information 
market maker. An increase in the amount of publicity or attention 
will lead to an increase in the amount of revenue for those who run 
the exchange. 
Under an Internet business model, a web site offers a program or 
service, usually either for free or at a de minimis cost to the user. To 
pay for its operating costs, the web site sells a portion of space on its 
page to advertisers.91 Thus, the potential for profit is tied to the 
number of “hits” or “eyeballs” that the page receives, in other words, 
the number of visitors the page is able to attract with its free 
 88. Jack Naudi, Should You Hire a Financial Advisor?You’ll Save a Lot On Fees By 
Going It Alone To Buy a Diverse Mix Of No-Load Funds, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Apr. 24, 2005, at E5 (describing how brokerage accounts work). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Tradesports homepage, http://www.tradesports.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 91. Stephen Baker, Where the Real Internet Money Is Made, BUS. WK., Dec. 27, 
2004, at 98. 
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service.92 As the web sites had no revenue stream from users, many 
stock analysts widely criticized this business model as impractical.93 
Despite these criticisms, it seems that many firms,94 as well as 
emerging information markets, are still using this model. 
Since the key to generating profits under both the traditional 
brokerage and Internet business models is to increase the number of 
individuals opening accounts, the amount of trading, or the number 
of hits that a particular web site receives, it stands to reason that 
many information markets will be geared to attract the broadest 
audience possible. Information market firms create predictive 
markets based on the number of participants they think a particular 
subject area will attract. And it appears that many information 
market entrepreneurs are currently doing this by selecting topics and 
areas that they think will appeal to a mass audience, such as sports, 
entertainment, and politics. 
Rather than starting with the question of what predictions 
would be most valuable – and then structuring a market to capture 
that information – what is currently occurring is that market 
entrepreneurs seem to target markets to areas that they believe will 
attract the most participants. And this seems somewhat intuitive: 
Public markets on popular topics will succeed, whereas public 
markets on the likelihood of dull events will fail. The idea of pitching 
the markets to a mass audience to attract publicity and generate fees 
or advertising, however, does have one serious consequence, namely 
the potential loss of valuable predictions in areas unlikely to attract 
and entertain a significant number of participants. If the primary 
goal of a market organizer is attracting traders, which may be a 
natural consequence of focusing on the revenue source that makes 
the market possible, then the information market becomes mostly a 
device for entertainment of its participants, and the information 
market may become largely divorced from its information-gathering 
and predictive functions. The result could be great fun, but provide 
little more social utility than the poker night at a local bar. 
One of the greatest challenges and opportunities facing 
information market entrepreneurs in the coming years will be to 
develop a business model that allows a profit from the predictions the 
information market generates. For now, however, the information 
market founders may be making profits by attempting to pull in as 
broad a group of participants as possible. In the next section, we 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Denise Caruso, In the Internet Rat Race, Greater Value Seems To Be Put on 
Devising the Next Business Plan Than on Making It Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, 
at C4 (critiquing internet business models). 
 94. See, e.g., Yahoo, http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2006); Google, 
http://www.google.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
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explore the elements that may attract participants to trade on 
information markets and why certain subjects seem to be more 
popular with a mass audience. 
2. Attractions to Participants 
On an intuitive level, it seems to make sense that markets that 
are more “easy” or “fun” or a combination of these two elements, are 
bound to get more attention and, at least initially, draw more 
participants. 
By “easy” we refer to the ease of gathering information about the 
uncertain event in question. For example, one could compare 
becoming informed about the Michael Jackson trial, with nightly 
coverage by the broadcast media, with the difficulty in obtaining 
information to predict the rate of new housing starts for the quarter. 
Predicting new housing starts requires specialized knowledge and 
analysis of the macro economy, the construction industry, and 
mortgage rates. All of this is knowledge that the average person 
would not know offhand, and, because of bounded rationality,95 might 
never take the time to analyze. Although the outcome of trials also 
depend on many complicated factors, at the very least the press 
coverage of the Jackson trial provoked opinions from the general 
public, reactions that could mimic those of the jury in the actual 
trial.96
Politics are also “easy” in the sense that the news media, both 
print and broadcast, currently give extensive coverage to political 
races. Throughout the course of the presidential races, for example, 
the popular press will typically cover campaign stump speeches, the 
candidates’ publicity tours, and the presidential and vice-presidential 
debates. In addition, major news outlets often have information 
about polling and trends among voter demographics, as well as 
analysis about the popularity of major candidates. All of this 
information makes it relatively easy for the average person to stay 
well-informed about the election. Moreover, because the data about a 
candidate’s appeal is frequently directly accessible to any observer by 
assessing political positions and debate performance, individuals can 
 95. Bounded rationality refers to the idea that individuals can only absorb and 
learn a certain amount of information. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of 
Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 104-05 (1955); Russell Korobkin, Bounded 
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 
1222-23 (2003) (exploring idea that bounded rationality leads consumers to agree to 
terms in form contracts). 
 96. This raises the interesting question of whether information markets work best 
when the market participants have roughly the same amount of knowledge as the 
actual decisionmakers. The question is, however, largely beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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develop their own assessments of the appeal independent of the 
media assessment of the candidate. Sometimes, for example, certain 
candidates are more popular with voters than with the press, and 
information markets with a political focus can reflect this fact. 
Politics may also be a popular subject for markets because of the 
ease of setting up such a market, at least in the United States. With 
a typical election in the United States, usually only two major party 
candidates are running for office. Participants in the market are 
asked to make what is essentially a binary choice between who will 
win or lose.97 Setting up such a binary market is easier for market 
organizers than is setting up a market in which the purpose is 
predicting the percentage of the vote that each candidate would 
receive. In addition, elections are “easy” because at the end of 
election day, all the votes are counted, and there is a clear “winner” 
and “loser,” which makes calculating payouts considerably easier.98
In addition, it may be that there is an element of “fun,” “play,” or 
“challenge” in an information market dealing with politics or 
entertainment that makes it appealing. To try to answer this 
question about the popularity of political and entertainment markets 
on the demand side, we turn to the social psychology work of Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi.99 In his work, Csikszentmihalyi has studied how 
individuals spend their time, whether working, sleeping, engaging in 
housework or leisure activities, and had them rate their moods.100 
Examining a large number of these mood diaries, Csikszentmihalyi 
determined that individuals had elevated moods when they engaged 
in particular activities that triggered “flow states.”101
According to Csikszentmihalyi, flow states involve concentration, 
the use of skills, learning, and adaptation.102 Engaging in activities 
that are challenging and at the same time enjoyable, an individual 
experiences flow, “the state in which people are so involved in an 
activity that nothing else seems to matter; the experience itself is so 
enjoyable that people will do it even at great cost, for the sheer sake 
 97. Of course, this is not always true. Consider third-party spoilers such as 
Theodore Roosevelt, Ross Perot, and Ralph Nader. See generally Jesse Ventura, 
Surviving as a Third-Party Candidate in a Two-Party Country, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 179, 179 (2002) (recounting Ventura’s successful third-party gubernatorial bid). 
 98. This is not always the case, as the 2000 presidential election demonstrated, but 
in the vast majority of elections, the winner and loser are rapidly ascertainable. 
 99. See MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL 
EXPERIENCE (1990). 
 100. See id. at 4. 
 101. Id. at 4-5. 
 102. See id. at 6. 
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of doing it.”103 Csikszentmihalyi attributes much of a person’s 
happiness and feelings of accomplishment to entering flow states.104
Traders who participate in particular information markets may 
experience a form of flow. Making correct predictions about sporting 
events or political elections involves a challenge, although perhaps 
one that, at the same time, does not involve too much of a transaction 
cost in acquiring the information necessary to be competitive in the 
market. Elements of this can be seen in the popularity of play-money 
exchanges as well as the sports gambling industry. The popularity of 
virtual money markets suggest that people are often motivated to 
participate in information markets, as Wolfers and Zitezewitz have 
noted, “through the thrill of pitting one’s judgment against 
others . . . .” 105
To some extent, there currently is an element of “fun” and 
challenge when either professional stock analysts or day traders 
follow financial news and developments and then execute trades. But 
information markets, especially those that take as their subject 
celebrities and sporting events, carry this idea even further. For such 
markets incorporate popular and enjoyable leisure activities, and 
then add the dimension of challenge and competition. 
3. Structural Factors 
In addition to the desires of the founders and the attraction of 
participants, additional factors that affect all parties influence where 
information markets have appeared. We identify some of the 
significant structural factors below. 
One of the most obvious structural factors is the legal 
restrictions on information markets. Robin Hanson has suggested 
that legal barriers have kept people away from developing 
information markets,106 and Emile Servan-Schreiber notes that most 
of the jurisdictions in which he and his business partner live ban on-
line gambling, so therefore “we are constrained to operate only play-
money markets.” 107 This restriction has influenced how NewsFutures 
operated its markets because the “economic constraints of operating 
play-money markets are very different from those of operating real-
money-markets. We have had to rely on media partnerships, 
corporate sponsorships, generating high-value data, etc.”108 The IEM, 
a market using real money in the United States, obtained a no-action 
 103. Id. at 4. 
 104. Id. at 40-41. 
 105. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 12, at 19. 
 106. Hanson Interview, supra note 30. 
 107. Servan-Schreiber Interview, supra note 63. 
 108. Id. 
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letter from the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) 
to assuage legal concerns, and the CFTC subsequently brought an 
enforcement action against another information market, alleging 
violations of U.S. commodities laws.109 Clearly legal restrictions have 
influenced the creation of information markets. 
Apart from legal restrictions, a number of other structural 
factors likely have influenced the development of information 
markets. One is the similarities with traditional polling and 
constitutionally protected speech. Participants and regulators may 
recognize as a form of polling the expression of an opinion on the 
outcome of the presidential election or who is likely to win an Oscar 
award. And, particularly in the case of speech on matters of public 
importance, the expressions of political expectations are arguably at 
the core of the speech the First Amendment was meant to protect.110
Also favorable is that information markets appear, at least on 
the surface, to pose no serious negative externalities.111 Because 
there typically are not huge sums of money at stake, it seems 
unlikely that a large number of people will become destitute by 
speculating in information markets, that the markets will take 
significant amounts from the poor as it is alleged that lotteries do, 
that organized crime will be attracted to the market, or that any of 
the harms associated with traditional gambling have appeared with 
information markets to any significant degree. 
Likewise, it is helpful to the development of information markets 
that they do not pose significant start-up costs, at least in 
comparison to other new technologies. (Consider in contrast the costs 
of starting a nuclear power plant or developing a new pharmaceutical 
drug). Emile Servan-Schreiber and Maurice Balick started three 
information markets with $100,000.112 While consequential, at the 
same time that is an amount that many entrepreneurs might be able 
to obtain through savings, loans, or grants. 
The relative ease of start-up is also helpful. The main task seems 
to be designing the market and attracting participants. This is not 
 109. See Press Release No. 5124-05, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Assesses Penalties Against Irish Company 
Trade Exchange Network Limited For Offering Illegal Commodity Option Contracts, 
(Oct. 4, 2005), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf05/opa5124-05.htm. A 
settlement was announced at the same time as the filing of the commission’s charges. 
Id. 
 110. The possibility of gain from one’s “speech,” of course, triggers other legal 
models such as restrictions on gambling. In a subsequent paper, we intend to explore 
the First Amendment constraints on the regulation of information markets. 
 111. Longer term, the matter may be more complex. We have pondered elsewhere if 
a successful information market in predicting Supreme Court decisions might 
undermine the Court’s legitimacy. See Cherry & Rogers, supra note 10, at 2. 
 112. Servan-Schreiber Interview, supra note 63. 
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trivial, but given that most of the work is intellectual (either in 
design, programming, or advertising), the origin of an information 
market is spared the transaction costs of, say, buying a factory or 
hiring a large staff of employees. By their nature, opening an 
information market can be a much leaner operation than, say, 
opening a manufacturing plant. 
Obviously, a number of other structural factors on various levels 
of generality might be explored, ranging from the big picture of 
human curiosity and to the details of the ease of using the Internet to 
participate in information markets. We will not attempt to exhaust 
these factors, but we do want to identify how they, in addition to the 
motivations of the founders and the participants, have influenced the 
origins of information markets. 
B. Underdeveloped Markets 
The data generated from a particular information market could 
be worth a great deal, either in money or in terms of social utility, 
but of course that all depends on what that data are and what the 
data are used for. Further, harnessing the power of information 
markets to make predictions could revise our way of thinking about 
areas that are dedicated to particular methods of thinking about 
future events. Although the entertainment, sports, and political 
arenas already have attracted a significant number of information 
markets, many areas where predictive markets would be useful, such 
as in law or business, have yet to be developed. In this section, we 
examine areas where information markets could provide valuable 
predictions and then identify barriers that may prevent particular 
markets from starting. 
There are still significant, broad areas where information 
markets do not yet exist. Ideally, where would the presence of 
information markets generate the most valuable information? 
Although there is a certain subjectivity of value,113 in using the term 
“valuable” we mean information that society could use, or which 
could create monetary wealth for either participants or organizers. 
One intriguing possibility that Professor Michael Abramowicz 
has advocated is government use of information markets to improve 
the administrative agency policymaking process.114 Professor 
Abramowicz proposes that information markets could predict 
 113. See LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 97, 204-5 
(Rev. ed. 1963) (1949) (describing subjectivity of value). For example, Michael Jackson 
himself would value the information provided by the market on his trial much more 
highly than would the average person who had no stake in the outcome. 
 114. Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, 
and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2004) [hereinafter 
Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking]. 
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insolvency of financial institutions,115 make budgetary forecasts for 
administrative agencies,116 and allow more efficient regulation by 
skipping notice-and-comment rulemaking.117 All of these options 
could improve both the quality and efficiency of government 
policymaking. 
Elsewhere, we have proposed harnessing the knowledge of the 
legal community to establish an information market in Supreme 
Court predictions.118 We also believe that another underdeveloped 
market area is the prediction of corporate and securities law 
regulation. Such a market could provide significant monetary 
benefits to corporations and attorneys if better predictions were able 
to be made about this area of law and the outcome of certain cases.119
Of course, this discussion of missing markets is itself extremely 
incomplete. The subject areas where information markets could 
potentially provide predictions are nearly as expansive as human 
knowledge itself. Information markets either have been asked or are 
currently being asked to predict everything from whether (or when) 
certain technological and scientific advances will occur120 to helping 
firms predict sales of new products in future quarters.121 There are 
vast areas where information markets could generate value by 
aggregating the knowledge that individuals possess, and so far we 
have only barely begun to scratch the surface of potential 
applications. 
Of course, some of these markets may be developed eventually. 
But because they do not present an immediate business opportunity 
— in terms of raising ad revenue or the number of eyeballs that come 
to the page — it may simply take a longer period of time for these 
markets to get started. After all, celebrity and election markets have 
an independent consumption value regardless of the information that 
could be extracted from them. This may not be the case in other 
areas, where the benefit ultimately inures to a diffuse group, the 
public. 
The question remains particularly puzzling when these missing 
markets could potentially yield valuable information. If the business, 
structural, and legal factors only partially explain why these markets 
 115. Id. at 987-88. 
 116. Id. at 990-91. 
 117. Id. at 993-95. 
 118. Cherry & Rogers, supra note 10, at 4. 
 119. Id. at 88. 
 120. Innovation Futures, http://www.innovationfutures.com (last visited Feb. 28, 
2006). 
 121. See discussion of the Hewlett Packard market, supra note 45 and 
accompanying text. 
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are underdeveloped, are there other explanations that could be 
offered? And can anything be done about it? 
IV. THE RANDOM WALK AND BEYOND 
We next examine whether market developments are the product 
of a “random walk.” After concluding that they are at least partially, 
we consider whether any alternatives to a random walk exist that 
could better aid the development of information markets.122
A. A Random Walk? 
We have set forth partial answers to why information markets 
have developed in some areas and not others, but these explanations 
do not seem entirely to resolve the question. The appearance of any 
given information market remains somewhat unpredictable and 
idiosyncratic. This section explores the hypothesis that, despite the 
elements set forth in Section III.A (including business models and 
government regulation),123 the appearance of any particular market 
is essentially random. It then compares and contrasts that possibility 
with the far-more established hypothesis that stock prices in the 
major financial markets follow what has been deemed a “random 
walk” – that is, that short-run changes in stock prices cannot be 
predicted.124 Finally, this section addresses the consequences for the 
potential of information markets if the random walk hypothesis 
about their origins is correct. 
1. Random Origins? 
The following two sections have resulted in a paradox. On the 
one hand, current information markets share a number of 
characteristics. In general, founders seem motivated by personal 
interests and profit seeking. Their participants are motivated partly 
by the possibility of success or profit, and partly by the psychological 
fun of playing, a reward facilitated by its compatibility with the 
human psyche. Certain structural elements also have influenced the 
creation of information markets. All of these factors set forth at least 
a partial explanation of how and why these markets have developed. 
Yet despite these areas of knowledge, the overall question of why 
markets exist on certain subjects and not others remains partially 
 122. See generally NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC 
SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES (2001) (exploring how 
markets emerge, and the factors necessary to sustain markets from sociological 
perspective). 
 123. See supra Part III.A. 
 124. See MALKIEL, supra note 15, at 24 (defining random walk). 
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unresolved. As discussed above, the explanation certainly is not 
social utility or even monetary value from the information generated. 
The answer, we suspect, may be that within certain boundaries 
such as business models and government regulation, the appearance 
of information markets is essentially random. Successful markets 
tend to share the characteristics described above, such as a relatively 
immediate pay off and popular interest in politics and entertainment. 
But within those boundaries, the markets exist chiefly because they 
sparked the interest of an entrepreneur dedicated enough to bring 
the market into being. 
This result seems consistent with the results of our interviews 
with founders of information markets. As discussed above, we 
focused questions on the motivation for creating markets, and we 
eagerly hoped for a coherent explanation of why these markets 
appeared in some areas and not others. What we found was that the 
reasons for starting a market in certain areas were often personal or 
even idiosyncratic (for example, Hanson’s study of science, Servan-
Schreiber’s family background in media). None of these data lend 
themselves to extrapolation into general rules of market origins.125
2. A Random Walk Down the Information Super-Highway 
If the origin of information markets is partly random, it would 
not be shocking when viewed in context of the general history of 
financial markets. Information markets may be a new development, 
but capital markets are not. Stock markets have been studied 
exhaustively for more than a century, by first-rate theorists and 
investment managers seeking a competitive advantage that might 
result in huge profits. Billions of dollars depend on which way certain 
stock prices might move, and the practical and academic research 
devoted to this question has been correspondingly significant.126
After such extensive efforts, many researchers kept running into 
the same phenomenon of randomness. One of the most famous of 
these academics is Burton Malkiel, an economist at Princeton. 
Malkiel defined a random walk as one “in which future steps or 
directions cannot be predicted on the basis of past actions.”127 In the 
 125. Although we had hoped for a clearer answer to explain the conundrum, we 
realized that the apparent randomness was consistent with our own experiences 
regarding the possibility of establishing an information market in Supreme Court 
predictions. See generally Cherry & Rogers, supra note 10. The idea for Tiresias arose 
by chance, and, in the end, we too were pawns of randomness. See generally NASSIM 
NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS 2 (2d ed 2004) (identifying human 
tendency to underestimate the degree of randomness in life). 
 126. See generally MALKIEL, supra note 15, at 125-44 (discussing fundamental and 
technical analysis). 
 127. See id. at 24. 
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context of the stock market, it means that short-run changes in stock 
prices cannot be predicted.128 This implies that Wall Street’s 
technical analysis involving charts of price movements is basically 
worthless,129 and the ability of professionals to out-perform the 
market by making superior stock selections based on the 
fundamental value of the underlying company is at best rare.130 This 
is an academic finding with trillion-dollar implications for the 
investment markets (with vast sums spent on active management) 
and for the millions of individual investors whose retirement security 
depends upon their investment choices (such as choosing index funds, 
which mirror an entire market sector, instead of high-cost mutual 
funds run by active managers). 
We suspect that a similar random walk may exist with regard to 
the emergence of information markets. In this context, a random 
walk would mean that the emergence of an information market in 
any narrow time period cannot be predicted from the emergence of 
past markets (analogous to technical analysis in the stock market) or 
the fundamental value of what an information market might provide. 
Markets for Oscar awards and pope bets exist; those for Supreme 
Court decisions or SEC rulemaking do not. Like daily movement of 
stock prices that cannot be predicted by fundamental value or past 
price movements, creation of information markets appear to be 
driven chiefly by randomness. 
3. The Toll of the Random Walk 
If the emergence of information markets is a random walk, what 
are its consequences? We have identified one above: The markets 
that currently exist do not provide the most valuable information 
that information markets are likely capable of producing. As 
discussed in Section III, a number of markets that would make 
valuable predictions simply do not exist. 
Less obviously, the random appearance of information means 
that sometimes markets attempt more difficult challenges without 
success while neglecting easier ones where a victory might be more 
readily achieved. For example, consider the limited areas of Supreme 
Court nominees. Predicting which individual President George W. 
Bush would nominate to the Supreme Court is a difficult task, one 
that information markets did not appear to perform particularly well, 
at least in significant advance.131 There are several possible reasons 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 169. 
 130. Id. at 200. 
 131. See, e.g., Andres R. Martinez, Supreme Court Market Lets You Put Your Money 
Where Your Hunch Is, Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, July 19, 2005 
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for this disappointing performance of information markets. There 
were a variety of options, not clearly defined, and the decision 
makers had considerable discretion about who to choose. They also 
did not specifically identify the top candidates under consideration, 
which reduces the ability of a market to concentrate its efforts on a 
limited number of options. In addition, it may be harder for 
information markets to predict the actions of a single decisionmaker, 
such as President George W. Bush, who may act from personal 
reasons that the public could not predict. 
In contrast, compare a subsequent market on the Supreme Court 
Futures Market to predict whether Judge Samuel Alito Jr. would be 
appointed to the Supreme Court after President Bush had nominated 
him. Tradesports predictions in early January 2006 indicated a clear 
likelihood of Alito’s confirmation, and in fact, the Senate approved 
the nomination later in the month.132 Here, there is a binary choice – 
appointed or not – which presents a narrower range of options 
compared with trying to predict the initial nominee. Similarly, a 
larger group of decisionmakers (100 senators) made the decision, 
which reduces the importance of any one particular individual who 
might act from idiosyncratic reasons that are less discernable to an 
information market. 
Why should the success or failure of any individual information 
market matter? On the one hand, those who create and participate in 
information markets are satisfying their personal desires without 
harm to others – certainly among the rights of a free and creative 
people. Moreover, any use of an information market spreads 
knowledge of the technology, and even the failures in prediction, if 
analyzed, can help discover where information markets are likely to 
work and where they are not. 
All of this is true, and we certainly intend no criticism toward 
those laboring to advance information markets. Nevertheless, the 
risks of the failure of information markets – as a whole — need to be 
(identifying Judge Clement as the frontrunner as of that Monday afternoon). The 
information markets reflected the conventional Beltway wisdom on the day of the 
nomination, which initially favored Judge Edith Clement of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
of the 5th Circuit. See id. On Tuesday July 19, the markets switched to indicating the 
selection of Judge John Roberts Jr. of the D.C. Circuit. This was before the president’s 
formal announcement that evening but apparently after leaks about who the nominee 
would be. For a blog discussion of the accuracy of the information markets on this 
question, see posting of Jim Lindgren, A Response to Orin on Tradesports, 
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_07_17-2005_07_23.shtml (July 20, 2005). 
 132. See, e.g., S.C. Confirm Alito, visited 10:41 a.m. EST on Jan. 9, 2006, 
www.tradesports.com, (indicating that 87.3 bid and an 89.5 ask for the proposition 
that Samuel A. Alito would be confirmed to the Supreme Court by the U.S. Senate); 
David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn in As Justice After Senate Gives Approval, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A1. 
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considered. Information markets are still novel in concept and 
limited in number.133 Whether they will expand across the world in a 
variety of fields or whether they will wither into an intellectual 
curiosity is not yet definitively resolved. One has to look only to the 
harsh rejection of the proposed Policy Analysis Market to see that, 
however valid the potential of information markets, there exists a 
risk of public rejection.134 For their spread in the long run, 
information markets need to be seen as more than an intellectual 
parlor game, and the clearest way to show their value is to produce 
accurate predictions on matters of consequence. Success in this helps 
advance the acceptance of information markets, but predictive 
failures suggest the opposite conclusion: that the technology is 
unreliable and may not be worth funding or may not deserve the time 
and participation of experts. A random walk in market origin gives 
little way to focus new markets on the areas most likely to succeed, 
and thus, with the increased risk of failure, the overall success of the 
technology becomes riskier. 
The random walk can also lead to duplication among information 
markets and competing efforts. Normally, competition in markets is 
positive. It leads businesses to offer better goods or services at lower 
prices. Without competition, businesses tend to become complacent, 
less innovative, and less consumer friendly. Indeed, a fundamental 
purpose of statutes such as the Sherman Antitrust Act are to 
promote such competition throughout the U.S. economy.135
Although competition assists the economy overall, it is less clear 
that it always benefits the development of information markets. As 
indicated above, one goal of markets is to attract substantial 
numbers of what Professor Hanson has dubbed “wolves” – 
knowledgeable participants more likely to provide informed and 
insightful predictions.136 Given that the number of “wolves” with 
knowledge of a technical subject is inherently limited, multiple 
markets on the same technical subject may dilute the wolf votes and 
decrease the overall accuracy of a particular market. It may be that 
an information market on a specialized subject that is functioning at 
least reasonably well is a new sort of natural monopoly, akin to the 
electric company or water utility for one’s house. If so, it may be that 
any additional competitors add little to the accuracy rates while 
 133. See infra App. A. 
 134. Hanson Interview, supra note 30 (noting that the controversy from PAM has 
deterred government agencies from experimenting publicly with information markets). 
 135. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be 
illegal”); Id. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”). 
 136. Hanson Interview, supra note 30. 
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allowing the wolves to be outvoted by those with lesser knowledge 
(those who Hanson dubs “sheep”).137
In addition, it will be interesting to see if the best designed 
markets truly become dominant in a competitive marketplace. One 
might expect this to happen because there are few if any barriers to 
entry and thus a new market offering a better design (either in ease 
or cost of use138 or skill in finding questions of importance likely to be 
answered successfully) could easily displace the inferior incumbent. 
Yet there would be transaction costs in moving to a new market, not 
only in time but also in decreased accuracy. The cost of decreased 
accuracy would be especially acute in the plausible scenario where a 
transition of wolves to a new information market occurred 
incrementally and haphazardly rather than massively and 
simultaneously. In this case, a period of time might exist when, in 
either or both markets, the dilution of knowledgeable votes resulting 
from the wolf migration could result in the sheep votes 
predominating and thus the information market potentially 
becoming less accurate. These transaction costs are hard to quantify 
in advance, but it might very well be that the transition costs are 
prohibitive and thus prevent the success of a superior competitor. 
Such a result would not be unique in the history of technology.139
 137. Professor Hanson himself dismisses this possibility of a sheep victory over the 
wolves as “rather unlikely,” citing his previous research. See ROBIN HANSON, RYAN 
OPREA & DAVID PORTER, INFORMATION AGGREGATION AND MANIPULATION IN AN 
EXPERIMENTAL MARKET, July 12, 2005, available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/ 
biastest.pdf; ROBIN HANSON & RYAN OPREA, MANIPULATORS INCREASE INFORMATION 
MARKET ACCURACY, July 2004, available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/biashelp.pdf. 
 138. For this reason, we would not anticipate much competitive success of a market 
that attempted to charge individuals significant amounts to participate. A free 
substitute likely would soon spring up at least on subjects of some academic interest, 
such as the IEM and the Supreme Court Futures Market at the University of North 
Carolina, which are sponsored by research universities. 
 139. As one simple example, consider the standard typewriter keyboard. The 
commonly accepted QWERTY keyboard was initially designed in the late 19th century 
for manual typewriters whose striking keys had a tendency to jam if the typist moved 
too quickly. To slow down the human operator, commonly used keys were placed in 
odd positions that required finger movements (“E” and “T”, for example, are the two 
most common letters in English, yet they are placed on the top row rather than the 
home row.) The design succeeded in slowing down the typist, but of course, modern 
electronic keyboards do not suffer from the same limitations. Yet we still keep the 
QWERTY keyboard, despite the slower speeds. Why? It isn’t for lack of alternative. 
The Dvorak keyboard, designed to let the typist move faster by placing commonly used 
keys on the home row, has been available since 1932. But the QWERTY keyboard was 
developed first and achieved market dominance. To switch, millions of typists would 
have to retrain, and thus far, the transition costs have proved prohibitive. See Jared 
Diamond, The Curse of QWERTY, DISCOVER MAG., Apr. 1997, at 34. What lasts is not 
always what is best, but sometimes merely what was first. What economists term 
“path dependence” can matter. 
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Finally, the random walk in the appearance of information 
markets muddles funding decisions. Is a given proposal the best 
possible subject for a new information market? Or merely what 
happened to appear at the time? Given the reality of limited 
resources that universities or foundations can devote, it would seem 
helpful to have some way of knowing where best to allocate the 
resources. In the stock market, investors can adapt to the random 
walk by purchasing index funds that track an entire market or 
market sector. If one cannot predict stock price movements, investors 
can just buy all the available stocks.140 Alas, one doubts that 
universities and foundations will fund every information market 
proposal, akin to purchasing an index fund of possible information 
markets. As a result, those who allocate resources to future 
information markets may have to face the vagaries of the random 
walk and consider its implications for funding decisions. 
B. Beyond the Random Walk? 
Given the disadvantages of a random walk in the origin of 
information markets, it seems worthwhile to consider if anything can 
be done about the random walk specifically and the more general 
issue of organization and advancement of the new field of 
information markets. Two main sources of organization present 
themselves: A private body or a government actor. We discuss what 
each possibility might accomplish and then evaluate its feasibility. 
1. Private Organization: AIMing for the Future 
What would a private organization mean? Although almost every 
information market is private in the sense of being non-
governmental, the type of organization here would be more akin to a 
trade association like the National Association of Realtors or a self-
regulatory organization such as the National Association of 
Securities Dealers. We shall call it the Association of Information 
Markets (AIM) for discussion purposes. 
Could AIM solve the problems of the random walk? We suspect 
not, at least not totally. Membership would be voluntary, and the 
organization would lack any power to bar new entrants into the 
market.141 Accordingly, if an individual wished to open a new 
information market, however idiosyncratic the endeavor might be, 
 140. See MALKIEL, supra note 15, at 267-68. This has done well as an investment 
strategy, beating some 75 to 80 percent of all actively managed funds on an after-fee 
basis. See id. at 268. 
 141. This is necessarily true in light of the antitrust laws. See generally 15 U.S.C.    
§ 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal”); Id. § 2 (“Every person who 
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”). 
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the organization would not interfere. Even if the organization 
somehow had the power to authorize or prohibit new markets (and it 
would not), exercising such power might be counterproductive. The 
organization might well have thoughtful views about what markets 
might be valuable, but intelligence is not infallibility, and the 
decisions about what markets might be successful or valuable might 
well be mistaken. Particularly in an emerging field that requires 
experimentation to develop the most successful approaches, 
entrepreneurs need to be free to fail. 
Nevertheless, the organization could help address the random 
walk by the organizing discussion of where information markets 
might be most useful and suggest the best areas for new markets. It 
might function as a type of peer-review panel for entrepreneurial 
ideas in this area, and its endorsement of an area as appropriate for 
an information market could help potential market founders obtain 
from outside sources such as foundations or government grants. In 
this way, while not eliminating the vagaries of the random walk, 
AIM might help make the process of market creation less chaotic. 
Beyond mitigating the random walk, such an organization could 
promote other common interests of the field of information markets. 
Examples of these common interests include many possibilities: 
• attracting new participants to existing information 
markets, 
• advertising the predictive efficacy of existing markets 
where possible, 
• analyzing the reasons for any predictive failures to 
understand why they occurred, 
• developing more accurate systems of information 
market design, 
• facilitating academic research into information markets 
(potentially by publishing an annual journal), 
• generally encouraging the expansion of information 
markets into new areas. 
AIM might also help prevent misunderstandings about the 
nature of information markets. Part of the reason the DARPA’s 
Policy Analysis Market failed was a congressional perception that the 
market would encourage people to profit by terrorist attacks.142 The 
reality was more complicated,143of course, and it might be helpful to 
have a voice for the information markets to be able to explain that 
 142. HANSON, IMPOLITE INNOVATION, supra note 9, at 9-13. 
 143. Id. 
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they are not about encouraging illicit gambling or allowing terrorists 
to profit from acts of savagery. 
Thus, while a private organization may not be able to mitigate 
all the negative consequences from a random walk, it could offer 
significant benefits for advancing the field of information markets. 
1. Government organization 
If the private sector cannot overcome the random walk, could a 
government do better? To be clear, we are not talking here about 
government regulation,144 merely government sponsorship. Could the 
U.S. federal government, for example, create a blueprint for the 
development of American information markets as part of some type 
of industrial policy? 
Certainly the government has assisted in developing information 
markets in areas of special interest to the government. The Policy 
Analysis Market, for example, was initially sponsored by DARPA 
before political controversy ended the project. And as discussed 
above, the use of information markets has significant potential for 
administrative agencies,145 and government agencies might well 
advance the development of information markets in these areas. 
But outside these areas of government interest, it seems 
questionable if the U.S. government will undertake substantial work 
with information markets. There are myriad groups seeking 
substantial government funding, ranging from agricultural interests 
to the military to victims of Hurricane Katrina. No well-organized 
constituency exists to lobby on behalf of information markets, and to 
the extent that Congress remains aware of the technology, it may 
associate it with the controversial DARPA plan that had to be 
abandoned.146 Consequently, the immediate prospects for a 
substantial government investment in information markets do not 
appear particularly promising. 
Furthermore, government actors may have incentives not to 
promote information markets. The information produced by some 
markets may be contrary to government interests if they reveal 
government actions in advance or undercut the official government 
position. It is quite easy to envision an information market reacting 
negatively to a politician’s speech, and if the market is funded by the 
 144. Government regulation of information markets is a fascinating subject, 
involving questions of international jurisdiction, traditional governmental authority in 
cyberspace, gaming law, analogies to constitutionally protected speech, and many 
more considerations. We will reserve this topic for a future article, however. 
 145. See generally Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative 
Decisionmaking, supra note 114. 
 146. Hanson Interview, supra note 30 (noting that the PAM controversy has 
discouraged government agencies from pursuing information markets publicly). 
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government, this might create tensions, even if no government 
officials ever attempted to control the content of a market (an 
attempt that may not be inconceivable). More broadly, to the extent 
that government agencies justify their existence through supposed 
expertise, information markets that expose the inaccuracy of 
government statements or provide private-sector competition to 
certain government estimates may not be particularly welcomed. 
More charitably, the prospect of government funding also might 
place government officials in the role of trying to pick market 
winners and losers – a task that they may not wish to undertake. 
Indeed, it would be consistent with a free-market ideology for 
government leaders to say that information markets are not 
inherently or even particularly a governmental function, and thus 
their development and sponsorship ought to be left to the private 
sector. 
In general, then, the prospects for government sponsorship of 
information markets on any broad level face significant obstacles and 
do not appear particularly promising at this time. That may change 
as the technology develops, or as the political climate changes with 
time, however, and of course government sponsorship of more 
discrete projects is still possible, despite the DARPA fallout. But for 
the moment, the federal government does not appear ready to 
coordinate a rescue from the consequences of the random walk. 
Thus, in the end, supporters of information markets, like 
investors in stock markets, may be left with the vagaries of the 
random walk. Actions such as forming an private association to 
advance information markets can have value. Yet on balance, the 
wisest solution may be to stop wishing for an unobtainable order and 
embrace the random messiness of markets – Michael Jackson pools 
and all. 
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APPENDIX A: CURRENT INFORMATION MARKETS 
The following is a list of currently functioning information 
markets on the Internet, compiled from Internet searches, and 
accurate as of January 25, 2006. See also Information Futures 
Markets, http://www.informationfuturesmarkets.com; AEI Brookings 
Joint Center, http://www.aei-brookings.org/pages/index.php?id=37; 
Brendan I. Koerner, What Weird Futures Can You Buy?: A Guide to 
Online Prediction Markets, http://slate.msn.com/id/2086316. 
 
Austrian Political Stock Markets/Austrian Electronic Markets 
http://www.imw.tuwien.ac.at/apsm 
Information markets predicting outcomes of Austrian elections. 
 
Blogshares 
http://www.blogshares.com 
Establishes a “fantasy stock market” for weblogs, web applications 
“which contain periodic, reverse chronologically ordered posts on a 
common web page” such as personal diaries or posts on a particular 
subject matter. Players invest fictional money in shares of blogs, 
which are valued by the number of links to them. 
 
Celebdaq 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/celebdaq 
British trading market that values celebrities based on their current 
popularity. Participants use fictional money to buy and sell shares in 
celebrities. Dividends, based on the amount of press coverage, are 
paid weekly. Participation is open to the general public. When a 
participant’s net worth tops £ 1,000,000, her shares are liquidated 
and she receives status symbol icons and £ 10,000 to continue future 
trading. 
 
Election Stock Market 
http://esm.ubc.ca 
The general public can use real money to bid on the outcomes of 
Canadian elections. 
 
Economic Derivatives 
http://www.gs.com/econderivs 
Web site launched by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank allowing 
investors to use real money to purchase options on macro-economic 
events, such as retail sales, employment statistics, inflation and 
general economic growth. 
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Foresight Exchange 
http://www.ideosphere.com 
Allowing players to bid, using virtual money, on the outcomes of 
questions, such as whether Hillary Clinton will be elected president. 
Scores are tabulated based on the number of correct bids. 
Participation is open to the general public. 
 
Hollywood Stock Exchange 
http://www.hsx.com 
Participants buy and sell shares of actors and new movies using 
virtual money. Valuation is based on the success of the movie. 
Participation is open to the general public. Winnings can be 
exchanged for discounts on merchandise. 
 
Influenza Prediction Market 
http://iemweb.biz.uiowa.edu/OUTBREAK/flu_quotes.html 
An invitation only market allowing Iowa medical professionals to buy 
and sell futures contracts to predict weekly influenza activity in 
Iowa. The market uses fake money, but winnings are converted to 
real money, which is paid as grants toward educational and 
professional expenses. 
 
Innovation Futures 
http://www.innovationfutures.com/bk/index.html 
Players use virtual money to buy and sell contracts based on future 
prospects of technologies as well as business, economic, and financial 
trends. Participation is open to the general public. Merchandise 
prizes are awarded to contest winners. 
 
InTrade 
http://www.intrade.com 
The general public can invest real money to bid on the outcomes of 
various events ranging from the closing value of the Dow to 
December snowfall in Central Park to which Supreme Court Justice 
will be the next to leave the bench. 
 
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem 
Best know for its presidential election market, IEM also has other 
political and economic markets in which members of the general 
public can invest real money. The IEM’s earnings and returns 
markets are limited to academic traders. 
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Long Bets - Accountable Predictions 
http://www.longbets.org 
Philanthropic project where a person can pay $50 to make a 
prediction about something or social or scientific importance that will 
or will not happen at least 2 years in the future. Someone can turn 
the prediction into a bet by taking the other side (and paying more 
money). The money goes to the designated charity of the winner. 
 
News Futures
http://www.us.newsfutures.com/index.html 
Players use virtual money to bid on the outcomes of news, financial, 
sports, and entertainment events. Participation is open to the public. 
Contests offer cash and merchandise prizes. Current contests involve 
pharmaceutical trends and 4th quarter drug sales. 
 
Political Stock Exchange 
http://www.politistock.com 
Players use virtual money to purchase shares of politicians and 
political events. Participation is open to the general public. Prizes are 
offered for contests. 
 
PublicGyan: The Public Knowledge Exchange 
http://www.publicgyan.com 
Users buy and sell futures to predict world events, technological 
inventions and business news. 
 
Smarkets 
http://www.smarkets.net 
Buy and sell futures to predict the top-selling products at 
amazon.com, a popular Internet site for buying books and music. 
 
TradeSports 
http://www.tradesports.com 
The general public can invest real money in futures contracts. 
Contracts are primarily for sporting events, but participants can also 
bid on politics, current events, and other topics. 
 
Wahlstreet 
http://www.wahlstreet.de 
Information market predicting outcomes of German elections. 
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Yahoo BuzzGame 
http://buzz.research.yahoo.com/bk/index.html 
Information market allowing the general public to buy shares in 
current technological products – web browsers, satellite radios, and 
the iPod. The site also contains an experimental section allowing 
users to trade on Atlantic hurricanes. 
 
Washington Stock Exchange 
http://www.washingtonsx.com 
An information market that tracks individual U.S. congressional 
races along with pending House and Senate legislation. 
